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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
right" he does not have, but this is the result of the decision in the instant
case.
Lawrence 1. Hollander
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DISABILITIES AS TOLLING
LIMITATION PERIOD
A city ordinance provides that "no suit shall be maintained against
the city ... for any tort unless ... written notice of such damage was, within
thirty (30) days after receiving of the injury alleged given to the city
attorney . . ."' In suit for personal injury caused by the negligence of a city
employee, the city pleaded notice had not been given within the time
allowed. Plaintiff requested permission to show that she was unconscious
as a result of her injury for the full thirty day period, and could not
fulfill the requirement as to notice. Held, one rcndered unconscious by an
act charged to have resulted from the negligence of the city, and who
remains unconscious as a result of that act for the full period allowed for
the giving of notice will not be precluded from recovery because of failure
to comply with the statute. City of Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So. 2nd
917 (1952).
In many instances limitation statutes contain saving clauses or excep-
tions in favor of persons under physical or mental disability which toll the
statute until the disability is removed.2  In recent years the courts have
loathed to interpose exceptions not expressly made by the legislature,3
however reasonable or equitable such exceptions may seem. 4 The courts
feel that such conduct would invade and obstruct the function and purpose
of the legislative branch of government." The result of this attitude is to
bar a pcrson from maintaining an action if he fails to give notice within
the prescribed period regardless of his disability.0
1. Miami Beach Code § 45 (1950).
2. Nesbit v. Topeka, 87 Kan. 394, 124 Pac. 166 (1912); Stoliker v. Boston, 204
Mass. 522, 90 N.E. 927 (1910); Ray v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 46 N.W. 675 (1890);
Kunkel v St. Louis, 163 S.WV.2d 1016 (Mo. 1942): Randolph v. City of Springfield,
302 Mo. 33, 257 S.W. 449 (1923); Cbouteau v. loss, 118 Okla. 76, 246 Pac. 844(1926); Gonyeau v. Milton, 48 Vt. 172 (1876); Born v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 719,
68 Pac. 386 (1902).
3. Barret v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30 So. 36 (1901); Williams v. Jacksonville,
118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54
(1918); Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 Vyo. 108. 42 P.2d 54 (1935).
4. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla.
671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Butler v. Craig, 27 Miss. 628 (1854); Buss v. Kemp Lumber
Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54 (1918).
5. Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Federal Crude Oil
Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 73 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 741 (1935); Pietsch v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, 101 N.W. 388 (1904).
6, Johnson v. Fresno County, 64 Cal. App.2d 576, 149 P.2d 38 (1944): Reid v.
Kansas City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S.W. 1047 (1917); Haynes v. Seattle, 83 Wash. 51,
145 Pao. 73 (1914); Ransom v. South Bend, 76 Wash. 396, 136 Pac. 365 (1913).
CASES NOTED
Other courts have recognized the manifest injustice of denying relief
to an injured person who, because of his incapacity as a direct result of
the injuries received, could not give the required notice within the time
allowed.7 It has been said that the requirement of notice necessarily pre-
supposes the existence of an individual capable of giving it.8 Any other
construction would be contrary to every instinct of humanity, and surely
not within the legislative intent.9
The Florida Supreme Court has in the past interpreted statutes as
herein involved with considerable strictness. 0 However, in the instant case
the court is departing from this view and refers to the circumstances
involved as constituting a narrow exception. The reason for this exception
is that if the plaintiff can prove she was unconscious for the full period
she could not have notified the city herself, nor could she authorize anyone
else to do so."
The court in the noted case undoubtedly arrived at an equitable
decision. However, the court is indulging in a dangerous policy of invading
the legislative domain. The Florida Supreme Court has in the past said
that when the statute contained an express exception it would not write
into the law other exceptions, nor create by judicial fiat a reason for tolling
a limitations statute.' 2  In a decision subsequent to the noted case, the
Court held that, in the absence of a saving clause, a statute of limitations
runs against all persons, whether under a disability or not.'8 That the ends
of justice might be better served by making exceptions in cases such as in
the instant one is unquestionable, but the making of such exceptions is
solely a prerogative of the legislature, not the court.
Lawrence I. Hollander
7. Webster v. Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 280 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1898); Birmingham v.
Weston, 233 Ala. 563, 172 So. 643 (1937); Schulstad v. San Francisco, 74 Cal. App.2d
785, 168 P.2d 68 (1946); Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 324 I11. App. 463,
58 N.E.2d 731 (1944); Stoliker v. Boston, 204 Mass. 522, 90 N.E. 927 (1910); Lazich
v. Belanger, 105 P.2d 738 (Mont. 1940); Kunkel v. St. Louis, 349 Mo. 1121, 163
S.W.2d 1014 (1942); Petition of Polk. 188 Misc. 727, 71 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N.C. 321, 22 S.E.2d 900 (1942); Wichita Falls v.
Geyer, 170 S.V.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Ehrhardt v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 664,
74 Pac. 827 (1903).
8. Birmingham v. Weston, 233 Ala. 563, 172 So. 643 (1937); Green v. Port
Jervis, 55 App. Div. 58, 66 N.Y. Stpp. 1042 (2d Dep't 1900); 17 McQUILI.N,
MUNICIPAL CO.PORATIONS § 48.06 (3d ed. 1950).
9. See McCollum v. South Omaha, 84 Neb. 413, 414, 121 N.W. 438, 439 (1909)
(dissenting opinion).
10. Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So.2d 917, 918 (Fla. 1952); Williams v. Jack-
sonville, 118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935).
11. Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So.2d 917, 918 (Fla. 1952).
12. Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1952).
13. Faolk & Coleman v. HaTper, 62 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1952); Smith v. Barnett,
116 Fla. 454, 156 So. 478 (1934); Gillespie v. Florida Mort. Co., 96 Fla. 35, 117 So.
708 (1928).
